PIMS/UBC Distinguished Colloquium: Karl Sigmund (University of Vienna)
Topic
Sanctions on the Commons: Social Learning and the Social Contract
Speakers
Details
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory helps to investigate the role of incentives in promoting cooperative behavior in joint enterprises. In particular, this lecture deals with the surprising effects of optional participation in collaborative enterprises. Coercion works better for voluntary rather than compulsory collaboration. A social contract need not be based on rational deliberation or the command of a higher authority. It can emerge spontaneously through social learning of individuals guided by no more than their myopic self-interest.
Additional Information
For more information, please see the event page at: http://www.math.ubc.ca/Dept/Events/index.shtml?period=future&series=all
Karl Sigmund (University of Vienna)

This is a Past Event
Event Type
Scientific, Distinguished Lecture
Date
April 13, 2012
Time
-
Location